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The Court of Final Appeal’s decision in Congo v FG Hemisphere has signifi -
cant human rights implications beyond the borders of Hong Kong. Current and 
former heads of state wanted for crimes against humanity or grand corruption 
can rest assured that the Hong Kong court will not strip them of immunity 
from prosecution like the House of Lords did in the case concerning General 
Augusto Pinochet. Former leaders need only worry that the immunity has not 
been waived by the new rulers. Stolen state assets are also safe in Hong Kong, 
subject only to waiver of immunity and United Nations Security Council sanc-
tions which China has allowed Hong Kong to implement and enforce.
Introduction
Most would shudder at the suggestion that the courts and executive in 
Hong Kong must speak with one voice on matters of human rights. Yet, 
could this be the implication of Congo v FG Hemisphere in holding that 
Hong Kong’s law and policy on state immunity must be the same as that 
of the Chinese mainland?1 Although Congo was not a criminal or human 
rights case, it is now the leading authority on how claims of immunity 
made in Hong Kong proceedings are to be handled.2 Does Congo send 
a message to the world that deposed dictators and their assets can fi nd 
sanctuary in Hong Kong, free from the accountability mechanisms of 
international justice? In short, this comment submits that the answer is a 
qualifi ed yes, though the exceptions are very limited. It is no coincidence 
that the word immunity is but a letter shy of the word impunity.
* Associate Professor and Director, Centre for Comparative and Public Law, Faculty of Law, The 
University of Hong Kong. I thank C.L. Lim for his comments on an earlier draft.
1 Democratic Republic of the Congo v FG Hemisphere Associates LLC [2011] 4 HKC 151 (hereinaf-
ter “Congo”).
2 International law recognises different types of immunities. Congo was concerned with state 
immunity or the immunity of a state. Other immunities include sovereign immunity which is 
the immunity of a head of state or former head of state, and diplomatic immunity relating to the 
immunities of diplomats and diplomatic missions. The scope of and exceptions to each immu-
nity may differ. See generally Hazel Fox, The Law of State Immunity, 2nd edn (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2008).
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Hong Kong, an Attractive Safe Haven
The idea of Hong Kong harbouring current and former heads of state 
wanted for international crimes is not merely hypothetical. Less than 
a month after the Congo judgment, China’s President, Hu Jintao, wel-
comed Sudan’s president, Omar al-Bashir, in Beijing, notwithstanding 
the warrants for the latter’s arrest issued by the International Criminal 
Court (ICC) and the international criticisms of the visit.3 ICC arrest 
warrants were issued in 2009 and 2010 for the Sudanese president, one 
alleging three counts of genocide and the other alleging several counts of 
war crimes and crimes against humanity, relating to the atrocities in the 
Darfur region.4 Immunity is not an issue for the ICC as the Rome Statute 
expressly removes this bar to prosecution.5 China is not a signatory to the 
Rome Statute and has several reservations about the ICC.6
Zimbabwe’s President, Robert Mugabe, and his family are regular 
visitors to Hong Kong, partly because his daughter was a student in a 
local university.7 The widely reported incidences of alleged assaults on 
foreign journalists by Mugabe’s wife and security guards, and the subse-
quent controversy over the non-prosecution of these individuals due to 
diplomatic immunity and other reasons, did not deter the Mugabes from 
returning.8 
Public attention to politically exposed persons and their fi nancial 
dealings has increased signifi cantly with the entry into force of the 
United Nations Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC).9 Parties to 
the UNCAC are bound not only to take steps to prevent corruption, par-
ticularly corruption on a massive scale (also known as grand  corruption 
3 Stephanie Nebehay, “U.N. rights boss raps China for not arresting Bashir”, Reuters, 30 June 
2011.
4 “Pre-Trial Chamber I issues a second warrant of arrest against Omar Al Bashir for counts of 
genocide”, ICC Press release, ICC-CPI-20100712-PR557, 12 July 2010.
5 Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 17 July 1998, UN Doc A/CONF.183/9*, 
and corrections in CN.577.1998 TREATIES-8 (Annex) and CN.357.1999 TREATIES-14 
(Annex), reprinted in 37 ILM 999 (1998) (hereinafter “Rome Statute”), Art 27. 
6 For China’s position on the ICC, see Bing Bing Jia, “China and the International Criminal 
Court: Current Situation” (2006) 10 Singapore Yearbook of International Law 87.
7 Barclay Crawford & Liz Heron, “Armed with immunity, Mrs Mugabe returns”, South China 
Morning Post, 17 Oct 2009.
8 Legislative Council Secretariat, “Fact sheet: A summary of local press reports on the inci-
dents concerning the wife and daughter of the President of the Republic of Zimbabwe from 
Jan 2009 to June 2009”, FC29/08-09, 9 July 2009, accessible at www.legco.gov.hk; Niall 
 Fraser, “Reviled at home but relaxed in Hong Kong, Robert Mugabe stocks up on shoes and 
suits”, South China Morning Post, 15 Aug 2010; C. L. Lim & Roda Mushkat, “The Hong Kong 
S.A.R. and External Affairs” in Johannes Chan & C. L. Lim (eds), The Law of the Hong Kong 
Constitution (Hong Kong: Sweet & Maxwell, 2011, forthcoming) (hereinafter “Lim & 
Mushkat”).
9 United Nations Convention Against Corruption, GA Resolution 58/4 of 31 Oct 2003, enter-
ing into force on 14 Dec 2005 (hereinafter “UNCAC”).
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or kleptocracy), but also to provide assistance and co-operation in the 
international recovery of stolen assets.10 When corrupt regimes and lead-
ers fall, it is common now to see the in-coming authority take legal action 
to try to recover the ill-gotten gains of the old regime. The Arab Spring 
of late 2010 saw the fall of the Tunisian and Egyptian leaders, followed 
almost immediately by asset freezes of property owned by the deposed 
leaders and their families.11 If, hypothetically, regime change were to 
occur in Zimbabwe someday, international attention will certainly turn 
to Hong Kong where, as reported in 2009, the Mugabe family was said 
to own a luxury home worth more than 45 million HKD.12 When asked 
about the Mugabe property, the Chinese government’s attitude to the 
issue at the time was revealed in this reply from the Foreign Ministry’s 
spokesperson: “Hong Kong is a free port, and even Falun Gong practitio-
ners can buy a property there, am I right?”13
Pinochet and Hong Kong
To illustrate the Hong Kong approach to state immunity, consider how 
the CFA would decide the Pinochet case if the same circumstances were 
to arise in Hong Kong.14 General Augusto Pinochet, while in London 
for medical treatment, was the subject of an arrest and later extradi-
tion request issued by a Spanish magistrate.15 Exercising universal juris-
diction, the Spanish request alleged that General Pinochet from 1973 
(when he took power in Chile after leading a military coup) to 1990 
commanded a criminal organisation that carried out illegal detentions, 
kidnapping, torture followed by death, forced displacement and disap-
pearances of thousands of people of different nationalities (including 
Spanish).16 The litigation that ensued in the English courts is notorious 
10 UNCAC, Ch 2 (preventive measures), Ch 4 (international cooperation), Ch 5 (asset recovery).
11 “Switzerland freezes assets of Zine al-Abidine Ben Ali and Laurent Gbagbo”, The Guardian, 
19 Jan 2011; Phillip Inman & Rajeev Syal, “Egyptian offi cials’ assets to be traced by Serious 
Organised Crime Agency”, The Guardian, 15 Feb 2011; “Switzerland identifi es $1bn worth of 
dictators’ assets”, The Guardian, 3 May 2011.
12 Malcolm Moore, “Zimbabwe: Robert Mugabe ‘buys £4m apartment in Hong Kong’ ”, The Tele-
graph, 15 Feb 2009.
13 Albert Wong, Raymond Li & Ambrose Leung, “Why can’t Mugabe buy a fl at in HK, asks Bei-
jing”, South China Morning Post, 17 Feb 2009.
14 R v Bow Street Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate Ex p Pinochet Ugarte (No 3) [2000] 1 AC 147 
(HL) (hereinafter “Pinochet”). See also Reed Brody & Michael Ratner (eds), The Pinochet 
Papers: The Case of Augusto Pinochet in Spain and Britain (The Hague: Kluwer Law Interna-
tional, 2000) (hereinafter “Pinochet Papers”).
15 Reed Brody, “The Case of Augusto Pinochet” in Pinochet Papers, ibid., 7–9.
16 “The Spanish Extradition Request” in Pinochet Papers, ibid., 209–210.
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and well-documented.17 Ultimately in the second hearing in the House 
of Lords, there were two issues that had to be decided. The fi rst issue 
was whether the crimes alleged against General Pinochet were “extradi-
tion crimes” within the Extradition Act 1989, and the second issue was 
whether General Pinochet was entitled to immunity as a former head of 
state in relation to such crimes?18 
On the fi rst issue, the House of Lords held that, as a result of the prin-
ciple of double criminality, General Pinochet could only be extradited 
to face charges in relation to torture occurring on or after 29 September 
1988, which is when torture outside the United Kingdom became a 
domestic offence.19 On the second issue, the Law Lords held in a major-
ity of six to one that General Pinochet was not entitled to immunity. 
Although the reasons given varied, Lord Browne-Wilkinson, in his 
speech presenting the judgment to the full House of Lords, stated that 
the “basic proposition common to all” the judgments in the majority was 
that:
“torture is an international crime over which international law and the par-
ties to the Torture Convention have given universal jurisdiction to all courts 
wherever the torture occurs. A former head of state cannot show that to 
commit an international crime is to perform a function which international 
law protects by giving immunity.”20
A subsequent House of Lords decision, Jones v Ministry of Interior for 
the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, however confi rmed that the immunity will 
apply to a civil claim brought against a State and its agents in respect of 
torture committed on the territory of that State.21 
Pinochet would be handled very differently if its facts arose in 
Hong Kong. The fi rst obvious difference is that a Spanish extradi-
tion request may go unanswered because Spain and Hong Kong have 
no  bilateral extradition agreement. However Hong Kong is bound by 
several  important international criminal law and human rights treaties, 
including the UNCAC and Convention Against Torture but not the 
Rome Statute, and the extradition obligations within these multilateral 
17 See generally Pinochet Papers, ibid.
18 “Speeches to the House of Lords, 24 Mar 1999 (Summary of Report of the Appellate 
 Committee)” in Pinochet Papers, ibid., 252–254.
19 Ibid.
20 Ibid., 253–254.
21 Jones v Ministry of Interior Al-Mamlaka Al-Arabiya AS Sudiya (the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia) 
[2006] UKHL 26 (hereinafter “Jones”).
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instruments could require a request from Spain or another state party to 
be acted upon. 
With respect to the fi rst Pinochet issue, the Hong Kong court would 
approach the matter like most other common law courts. The issue con-
cerns extradition law which is an aspect of foreign affairs that the Cen-
tral People’s Government has authorised Hong Kong to conduct on its 
own.22 Applying common law principles the court would determine how 
the double criminality rule contained in the Fugitive Offenders Ordi-
nance applies to the circumstances of the case.23 One factual difference 
is that torture outside of Hong Kong did not become a domestic offence 
until 21 January 1993 when the Crimes (Torture) Ordinance came into 
force.24 If the Hong Kong court follows the Pinochet holding it would 
mean there was no extraditable offence because General Pinochet relin-
quished power in 1990, three years before torture became a domestic 
offence.
A stark difference appears in how the Hong Kong court approaches 
the second issue. Taking fi rst the approach of the dissenting judges in 
Congo, they would see the task as ascertaining the post-1997 common 
law position in Hong Kong of immunity for former heads of state in rela-
tion to torture committed while serving as a head of state.25 The approach 
would have regard to Chinese policy but not submit to it.26 Lord Browne-
Wilkinson’s statement in Pinochet of the common law position would be 
persuasive, although not controlling. His Lordship held that at common 
law a former head of state loses immunity, ratione personae, on leaving 
offi ce and enjoys only immunities, ratione materiae, meaning subject-
matter immunity covering only offi cial acts done whilst head of state.27 
If the court also accepts the proposition that the commission of an inter-
national crime such as torture (and perhaps also grand corruption) could 
not conceivably be regarded as an offi cial function of a head of state, then 
the immunity will be pierced.28 The Chinese policy being a relevant and 
distinct consideration may contribute to a different result, but ultimately 
the minority’s approach is one that allows for a richer more cosmopolitan 
22 See Basic Law, Arts 96 & 153; See n 8 above.
23 The double criminality rule is contained in s 2(2) of the Fugitive Offenders Ordinance 
(Cap 503).
24 Crimes (Torture) Ordinance (Cap 427), originally Ord No 11 of 1993; Crimes (Torture) Ordi-
nance (11 of 1993) (Commencement) Notice 1993, L.N. 17 of 1993.
25 Congo, paras 84, 523.
26 Congo, paras 124, 127 & 524.
27 Pinochet, 202.
28 There is support for this in the Pinochet judgments of Lord Browne-Wilkinson (p 205), Lord 
Hope (p 247), Lord Hutton (p 264), Lord Millet (p 277), and Lord Phillips (p 292).
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legal debate that draws upon comparative developments in the common 
law and international law.
By contrast the majority’s approach is narrow, affording limited scope 
for judicial analysis. No Art 158 reference will be needed because the 
CFA’s comprehensive reference in Congo settles the approach to be 
adopted. According to this approach, the Hong Kong courts and Central 
Authorities must speak with one voice on state immunity law and policy. 
The task then is to ascertain the relevant Chinese policy and apply it as 
Hong Kong law to the circumstances of the case. The issue of the immu-
nity of a former head of state was not considered in Congo, thus neces-
sitating the relevant position to be established either by the Art 19 fact 
of state certifi cate procedure or, via the less formal procedure endorsed 
in Congo, an offi cial letter from the Offi ce of the Commissioner of the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs of China setting out the relevant position.29 
Indeed the practical reality may well be that once the Chinese policy 
of upholding the immunity is determined, the matter will not reach the 
courts because the executive will have declined to take action.30
Does it matter that the prohibition against torture is a customary 
international law norm of jus cogens status? The Law Lords in Jones, cit-
ing the International Court of Justice’s decision in Democratic Republic of 
the Congo v Belgium,31 did not believe the jus cogens character of the norm 
weakened the claim to immunity because immunity is a procedural doc-
trine that did not necessarily result in the breach of the jus cogens norm.32 
But more relevant to Hong Kong’s Congo case is whether the jus cogens 
character of the norm requires that the Hong Kong courts have greater 
autonomy to decide the question of immunity. Unfortunately there is 
nothing in the Congo judgments that would seem to allow for such an 
exception. 
Congo and the Immunity of Former Heads of State
The majority’s watertight approach to state immunity can be sum-
marised as follows. First, it is “a State’s prerogative to decide on the scope 
of the immunity it is prepared to confer on other States and in particular, 
whether to recognize further exceptions to absolute immunity”  [emphasis 
29 Basic Law, Art 19(3); Congo, para 363.
30 As was the case with the non-prosecution of Grace Mugabe for assault due to a claim of diplo-
matic immunity, see n 8 above.
31 Arrest Warrant of 11 Apr 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v Belgium), Judgment, ICJ 
Reports 2002, p 3.
32 Jones, para 24.
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added].33 Arguably Pinochet is not a case concerning an exception to 
absolute immunity, but one can hardly deny that it concerns the scope 
or width of the immunity doctrine; the question being the scope of the 
immunity enjoyed by current and former heads of state.34 Second, under 
the Basic Law, this prerogative is exercised exclusively by the Central 
Authorities, and Hong Kong has no authority to decide its own state 
immunity law and policy.35 Third, to allow Hong Kong to adopt a pos-
sibly divergent state immunity policy risks causing embarrassment and 
prejudice to China in its conduct of foreign affairs.36 It would be incon-
sistent for the Hong Kong courts to reach the same result as in Pinochet 
while the Chinese policy is to accord full immunity ratione personae to 
former heads of state. Fourth, Hong Kong courts apply a common law 
of immunity that is necessarily adapted and modifi ed to conform with 
Hong Kong’s status as a local administrative region of China.37 In prac-
tice, this means executive declarations of facts of state stating China’s 
immunity policy control the common law position to be applied.
The majority reserved only minimal authority for judicial decision-
making. First, it is for courts to determine the legal consequences that 
fl ow from the facts of state and particularly how the common law is to 
be modifi ed in accordance with Hong Kong’s status.38 But the practical 
reality is that the declarations of facts of state will be drafted by lawyers 
to leave the court little room to drift from the declaration in the adapta-
tion process. Second, courts can decide issues related to waiver of state 
immunity.39 The majority also noted that courts may decide other legal 
issues but gave no hints as to what those issues might be.40 Waiver would 
seem to be the only way for a Hong Kong court to seize jurisdiction in a 
Pinochet-type case. The waiver would need to come from the state and 
not the former sovereign.41 But the majority’s requirement of an unequiv-
ocal express waiver from the state at the time the court’s jurisdiction 
is invoked leaves no room to argue that ratifi cation of the Convention 
Against Torture or breach of a jus cogens norm are enough to constitute 
a valid waiver.42 It may however be that Congo’s stringent waiver test 
33 Congo, para 231.
34 Note that the certifi ed question before the House of Lords in Pinochet was “the proper interpreta-
tion and scope of the immunity enjoyed by a former head of state from arrest and extradition pro-
ceedings in the United Kingdom in respect of acts committed while he was head of state” (p 152).
35 Congo, paras 324–331.
36 Congo, paras 269 & 290.
37 Congo, paras 297, 313, 323 & 336. 
38 Congo, para 297.
39 Congo, para 298.
40 Ibid.
41 Pinochet, 205.
42 Congo, para 392; Pinochet, 267 (Lord Saville).
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should not apply to immunity claims made by a former head of state; a 
less exacting standard should be applied by the court where the common 
purpose is to avoid impunity for an international crime.
There is no reason to believe that the Chinese policy will be anything 
less than absolute immunity ratione personae for former heads of state. 
Chinese concerns with the ICC, particularly its jurisdiction over nation-
als of non-state parties, and the exercise of universal jurisdiction by some 
countries are well documented.43 These concerns are likely heightened 
by law suits that have been brought in the United States and Spain 
against former Chinese President Jiang Zemin.44 
Immunity and Asset Freezes
As with extradition requests and prosecution, immunity which has not 
been waived will preclude almost all actions to freeze and seize the assets 
of serving and former heads of state, whether by criminal or civil pro-
cesses. Issues will arise if the asset is not held in the name of the leader/
former leader but in the name of a family member, associate or company. 
Most of these issues will concern not the scope of the immunity doctrine 
but rather the application of the doctrine and, as such, can be left to the 
courts to decide. 
A particularly interesting scenario is where the imprimatur of the 
asset freeze is from the United Nations Security Council acting under 
Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. A recent case in point is 
the action taken in early 2011 against Libya and its current head of state, 
Muammar Qadhafi . In February and March, the Security Council passed 
two resolutions under Chapter VII requiring member states to impose 
an arms embargo, travel ban, assets freeze and other measures against 
the Libyan leader and his supporters.45 On 30 June 2011, regulations to 
implement these two resolutions were gazetted in Hong Kong.46 
Could proceedings under the regulations against Qadhafi  and/or his 
property be halted on grounds of immunity? What makes this scenario 
unique is that China could have vetoed the Security Council  resolutions. 
43 See n 6 above; Xue Hanqin, “Chinese Observations on International Law” (2007) 6 Chinese 
Journal of International Law 83, 91–93.
44 Plaintiffs A, B, C, D, E, F v Jiang Zemin, 282 F.Supp.2d 875 (2003) (DC); Mugambi Jouet, 
“Spain’s Expanded Universal Jurisdiction to Prosecute Human Rights Abuses in Latin America, 
China, and Beyond” (2007) 35 Georgia Journal of International and Comparative Law 495.
45 UN Security Council Resolution 1970, UN Doc S/RES/1970 (2011), 26 Feb 2011; UN Secu-
rity Council Resolution 1973, UN Doc S/RES/1973 (2011), 17 Mar 2011.
46 United Nations Sanctions (Libya) Regulation 2011 (Cap 537, sub. leg. AW), originally 
L.N. 114 of 2011.
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Instead, China voted in favour of the fi rst resolution and abstained when 
the vote was taken on the second resolution.47 Moreover, China must 
give specifi c instructions to the Chief Executive before the Hong Kong 
regulations can be made.48 In March 2011, China’s Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs instructed the Chief Executive to “fully implement” the two 
Security Council resolutions.49 There is no reference in either the resolu-
tions or regulations to upholding state immunity; indeed the intention 
is quite clearly to the contrary. In these circumstances, the Hong Kong 
court could reasonably proceed on the basis that the Chinese policy was 
not to grant immunity to Libya and the Libyan leader for purposes of 
implementing the Security Council resolutions, unless there was before 
the court an Art 19 certifi cate stating otherwise.
Conclusion
The clear implication from Congo is that current and former heads of state 
wanted for international crimes will have full immunity in Hong Kong 
courts unless the immunity has been waived by the state. The  property 
of such leaders will also be secure in Hong Kong unless immunity has 
been waived or the action is taken under regulations made pursuant to 
the United Nations Sanctions Ordinance.50 Congo exposes an irony of 
one country two systems, that while it entrenches strong human rights 
protections within Hong Kong it unfurls the welcome mat to individu-
als who may have committed some of the world’s most egregious human 
rights violations.
47 See Voting Record Search from the United Nations Bibliographic Information System 
web site available at http://unbisnet.un.org:8080/ipac20/ipac.jsp?profi le=voting&menu=
search&submenu=power#focus. 
48 See generally Cheng Yan Ki Bonnie, “Implementing Security Council resolutions in 
Hong Kong: an examination of the United Nations Sanctions Ordinance” (2008) 7 Chinese 
Journal of International Law 65.
49 Commerce and Economic Development Bureau, “United Nations Sanctions (Libya) Regula-
tion 2011”, paper for the Legislative Council Subcommittee to Examine the Implementation 
in Hong Kong of Resolutions of the United Nations Security Council in relation to Sanctions, 
LC Paper No. CB(1)2642/10-11(01), June 2011, Annex B.
50 United Nations Sanctions Ordinance (Cap 537).
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